Abstract:  In this talk, I will first discuss the Network- and Information Systems Security Directive (NIS2) and what it means for policy makers, essential and important entities, and product developers. Spoiler: for policy makers this means making implementation law, and assure enforcement. For essential and important entities this means implementing risk based security policies and measures. For product developers this will probably mean that liability of essential and important entities will be passed down the supply chain. The talk will focus on what essentially changes for these three categories of organisations. With regard to the financial industry, this industry has its own regulation (DORA), which I will not specifically discuss. However, DORA and NIS2 have many similar aspects.
Second, I will discuss what is coming up next: the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA). This is an EU regulation, which means that it is directly applicable in the entire EU once formally published. It is expected to be fully in force in 2027, pending official publication in Q4 2024. The CRA addresses essential security requirements for all products with digital elements. It addresses all types of IT products, from doorbell camera to nuclear process monitoring systems and anything in between. I will highlight what this means for developers of these products. Spoiler: all products will have to be evaluated from a security perspective, either by self-assessment or an independent assessment.
There are many more EU directives and regulations upcoming, I will not discuss these due to time constraints, and these being less directly relevant for all three audiences. National legislation, which addresses national security, is not part of this talk. However, questions to this regard may be asked.

Abstract:  Even before the NIST PQ standards came out, Google, Cloudflare, Apple, and Signal Foundation turned on Kyber PQ key exchange in their products used by billions of users. We appear to have solved PQ confidentiality and the harvest-now-decrypt-later (HNDL) threat: you just add Kyber. The glaring omission is that everyone is postponing PQ authentication. Why is this seemingly so difficult? In this talk, I will go over why PQ authentication is not something that we can afford to not be thinking about. Even though it does not seem as urgent as it’s not sensitive to HNDL attacks, PQ authentication is much harder and much more expensive to achieve. Along the way, I will discuss the NIST call for additional PQ signature algorithms (and why it is probably not worth waiting for its results). Finally, we will briefly go beyond “boring” cryptography and see that even after the NIST competition, we’re nowhere near able to solve all problems by “just replacing the algorithms”.